

























idea	 that	 there	 are	 obligations	 to	 form	 beliefs	 is	 puzzling.	 This	 is	 because	 beliefs	 are	
normally	 not	 taken	 to	 be	 under	 our	 voluntary	 control.	 Unlike	 action,	we	 can’t	 simply	








This	paradox	 is	one	of	 the	core	puzzles	 in	what	might	be	called	the	ethics	of	religious	
belief.	 While	 the	 ethics	 of	 belief	 simpliciter	 is	 a	 familiar	 topic	 that	 concerns	 our	
                                                             
1	Doxastic	 involuntarism,	 the	view	 that	beliefs	aren’t	 subject	 to	voluntary	control,	 is	quite	popular	and	



















	 The	 final	 response	 is	 divided	 into	 two	 camps.	 Both	 deny	 (3),	 but	 for	 different	
reasons.	The	first	camp	maintains	that	(3)	is	false	because	we	have	indirect	control	over	
our	beliefs;	 this	 is	represented	by	Davis	(1991)	and	Ferreira	(1983)	 in	 this	 issue.	The	
second	camp	argues	(3)	is	false	because	we	sometimes	have	a	more	direct	kind	of	control	
















that	 having	 certain	 beliefs	 is	 required	 for	 salvation.	 Pojman	 argues	 for	 Clifford’s	
principle—that	“it	is	wrong	always,	everywhere,	and	for	anyone,	to	believe	anything	upon	








	 Speak’s	 main	 objection	 to	 Pojman’s	 argument	 involves	 his	 use	 of	 Clifford’s	
principle.	 Speak	 is	 not	 convinced	 that	 believing	without	 sufficient	 evidence	 violates	 a	
moral	obligation—this	is	a	very	strong	version	of	evidentialism.	I’m	in	full	agreement	with	
Speak	 on	 this	 point.	 Evidentialism	 is	 more	 traditionally	 construed	 as	 something	 we	
epistemically	ought	to	do,	not	something	that	concerns	morality.	And	in	fact,	there	appear	







evidence,	 you	 should	 take	 it.	 Thus,	 it	 sometimes	 seems	permissible,	 and	maybe	 even	
obligatory,	to	believe	against	the	evidence,	if	a	greater	moral	good	is	at	stake.	Insofar	as	
evidentialism	 confers	 an	 obligation,	 it’s	much	more	 plausibly	 an	 epistemic	obligation,	
rather	than	a	moral	one.		
	 Speak	 then	 argues	 that	 belief	 isn’t	 required	 for	 salvation	 without	 relying	 on	
Clifford's	principle.	 Instead,	he	 relies	on	 something	quite	 like	our	 initial	paradox—we	





Consider	 Thomas	 who	 does	 not	 trust	 the	 police.	 He	 has	 been	 raised	 in	
circumstances	in	which	trusting	the	police	has	been	unjustified…	Now,	however,	
he	is	confronted	with	a	police	officer	attempting	to	save	him	from	a	dangerous	
situation.	 The	 officer	 announces	 that	 Thomas	 needs	 to	 jump	 down	 from	 a	
precarious	position	so	that	the	officer	can	catch	him.	Furthermore,	Thomas	has	














	 This	 is	similar	to	Zamulinski’s	account	 in	“Christianity	and	the	Ethics	of	Belief.”	
Zamulinski	responds	to	the	complaint	that	religious	belief	is	irrational	by	arguing	that	the	





One	 thing	 I	 found	 interesting	 about	 Zamulinski’s	 account	 is	 that	 he	 thinks	 genuine	
religious	faith	is	thicker	than	mere	acceptance	(in	Cohen’s	1989	sense),	as	we	can	accept	
a	 proposition	 causally	 or	 contingently.	 He	 argues	 that	 religious	 faith	 involves	 a	
commitment	 one	 will	 not	 readily	 give	 up,	 and	 one	 that	 results	 in	 consistent	 action.	
Zamulinski	also	suggests	that	the	emphasis	on	belief	in	some	religions	may	simply	be	a	
confusion,	since	the	distinction	between	belief	and	assumption	is	subtle,	and	assumptions	









Belief.”	 Lints	 understands	 epistemic	 warrant	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 intellectual	 obligation—i.e.	
when	one's	belief	 that	p	 is	warranted,	 it	 is	because	one	has	 fulfilled	one’s	obligations	
concerning	p.	He	notes	that	sometimes,	the	evidence	forces	our	hand,	and	we	cannot	help	
but	believe.	In	these	cases,	our	beliefs	can	still	be	warranted	in	some	sense.	He	explains,	
“When	 it	 is	not	 possible	 to	 believe	 otherwise	and	 thus	when	 the	 relevant	 intellectual	
obligations	have	been	overridden,	 I	want	 to	suggest	 there	 is	still	a	 legitimate	sense	of	
epistemic	 warrant	 which	 remains”	 (p.	 428).	 Lints	 motivates	 this	 by	 focusing	 on	 the	
analogy	with	perceptual	belief.	Often,	perceptual	beliefs	seem	to	simply	happen	to	us—
when	we	see	a	tree,	we	simply	believe	that	there’s	a	tree.	However,	it	still	makes	sense	to	
ask	 which	 perceptual	 beliefs	 we	 ought	 to	 have.	 Lints	 thinks	 this	 is	 instructive	 for	














lifeguard	 cannot	 save	 both.	 Intuitively,	 the	 lifeguard	 nonetheless	 ought	 to	 save	 both,	
































believe	p,	 especially	 if	p	 is	 the	proposition	 "God	exists."	We	can	 take	 actions	 that	will	
influence	our	beliefs	over	time;	Davis	provides	a	long	and	helpful	list	(p.	30):	










sincere	 friend,	 truthful'.	 Going	 beyond	 Pascal's	 specific	 advice,	 it	 seems	 that	 I	
could	 also:	 associate	 regularly	 with	 believers,	 commit	 myself	 publicly	 to	 the	
religious	 life,	 look	 for	 evidence	 that	 supports	 the	 existence	 of	 God,	 have	 long	












in	 the	 paper	 is	 to	 explain	 and	 expand	 upon	 John	 Henry	 Newman’s	 ethics	 of	 belief.	
Newman’s	 view	 responds	 to	 strict	 doxastic	 involuntarists	 such	 as	 Williams,	 Pojman,	
Price,	 and	 Swinburne.	 I	 enjoyed	 this	 paper	 for	 two	 reasons.	One,	 it	 provides	 a	 timely	
reminder	that	the	popularity	of	strict	doxastic	involuntarism	is	relatively	recent.	When	
one	looks	at	the	history	of	philosophy,	doxastic	involuntarism	is	not	at	all	the	orthodox	







popularity	 throughout	 the	 history	 of	 philosophy.	 Maybe	 we	 shouldn’t	 be	 so	 quick	 to	




















over	 time	 we	 gain	 counterevidence	 renders	 p	 unlikely;	 this	 forecasts	 a	 common	
contemporary	move	in	favor	of	the	possibility	(and	rationality)	of	belief	and	low	credence	
(see	Buchak	forthcoming,	Jackson	2019).		
	 The	 final	 two	 papers	 in	 this	 issue	 argue	 that	 non-evidential	 believing	 is	
psychologically	 possible.	 I’ll	 argue	 that	 this	 allows	 for	 the	 possibility	 of	 exercising	 a	







term	 process,	 maybe	 one	 of	 deliberation	 or	 of	 focusing	 on	 certain	 aspects	 of	 one’s	





faith	 is	 a	 kind	 of	doxastic	 venture	 that	 involves	 believing	 beyond	 or	 even	 against	 the	
evidence.	 He	 responds	 to	 three	 objections	 to	 the	 view:	 that	 a	 doxastic	 venture	 is	
impossible,	that	a	doxastic	venture	is	unjustified,	and	that	the	doxastic	venture	view	of	
faith	fails	to	reconcile	faith	and	reason.	His	response	to	the	first	objection	most	directly	
challenges	 claim	 (3)	 of	 our	 puzzle.	 Here,	 Bishop	 focuses	 on	what	 he	 calls	 “believing-
acceptance”	in	which	one	both	believes	p	and	acts	on	p.	He	argues	that	we	can	let	our	
beliefs	guide	us	or	not,	and	when	we	let	our	beliefs	guide	us,	this	solidifies	them	in	our	
minds.	 This	 is	 one	 kind	 of	 control	 we	 may	 exercise	 over	 our	 beliefs.	 Furthermore,	
following	William	James,	Bishop	argues	that	certain	propositions	(including	what	he	calls	












aim	 at	 truth,	 we	 cannot	 form	 beliefs	 for	 non-evidential	 reasons.	 In	 other	words,	 you	
cannot	believe	that	the	evidence	for	God’s	existence	is	undecidable	and	also	consciously	
believe	that	God	exists.	 In	response,	Cockayne	et	al.	 invoke	epistemic	permissivism,	 the	
view	that	in	some	evidential	situations,	there	is	more	than	one	rational	attitude	one	can	
take	toward	a	proposition	p.	If	permissivism	is	true,	then	two	people	can	share	evidence	
and	 take	 different	 positions	 on	whether	God	 exists,	 and	 both	 be	 perfectly	 rational.	 In	
permissive	cases,	the	evidence	underdetermines	rational	belief.	Cockayne	et	al.	rightfully	
point	 out	 that	 in	 this	 situation,	 non-evidential	 factors	 can	 play	 a	 role	 in	 determining	
whether	one	believes.	If	there’s	an	epistemic	tie,	why	couldn’t	that	tie	be	broken	by	one’s	
will	or	desires?	This	especially	seems	possible	if,	as	James	says,	there’s	a	forced	choice.	
Suppose	 one’s	 evidence	 is	 balanced	 between,	 say,	 belief	 and	 withholding,	 rendering	





















will,	 in	 the	 ‘duck-rabbit’	 fashion,	between	 experiencing	 the	 image	as	 representing	 the	
world	 as	 self-subsistent	 and	 experience	 the	 image	 as	 representing	 the	 world	 as	
dependent”	(1994:	35).	Thus,	while	I	don’t	take	myself	to	have	fully	defended	this	here,	I	
























involves	 belief,	 a	 move	 that	 many	 in	 the	 faith	 literature	 have	 made.	 However,	 the	
possibility	of	doxastic	control	makes	it	more	appealing	that	faith	entails	belief.	In	general,	
our	 views	 on	 the	 ethics	 of	 religious	 belief—concerning	 topics	 such	 as	 evidentialism,	




and	 little	 to	 lose	 if	God	doesn’t	exist.	Whether	non-evidential	believing	 is	possible	and	




and	 the	 papers	 in	 this	 issue	 present	 four	 plausible	 solutions.	 First,	 maybe	 we	 have	








































                                                             
4	Thanks	to	Marc-Kevin	Daoust	for	helpful	comments	on	an	earlier	draft.	
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